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CAN WE TALK?
A Review of Jay Katz, The Silent World of
Doctor and Patient
ARTHUR CAPLAN*

The Silent World of Doctor and Patient I is an eloquent plea for
recasting the doctor-patient relationship. Professor Katz convincingly
demonstrates that both the medical and legal professions have not
done enough to insure that honest and open communication in doctor
patient relationships will prevail in both therapeutic and experimental
settings. Physicians, as Katz perceptively notes, are "well trained to
attend caringly to patients' physical needs" (p. 130). But, as he ob
serves, little in their training prepares them to attend with skill or zeal
to patients' decisionmaking needs.
Philosophers, theologians and legal scholars place much emphasis
upon patient autonomy in their writings in analyzing the norms that
ought to constitute the researcher-subject and physician-patient
relationships. 2
But the harsh reality is quite different from the idealized norm.
As Professor Katz argues convincingly through his careful analysis of
legal cases, clinical case studies, and the close examination of codes of
professional conduct in medicine, physicians have been unwilling to
actually share decisionmaking authority with their patients, and the
legal system has been, at best, reluctant to attempt jurisprudential re
forms that would challenge or disturb this reluctance.
Professor Katz cites a number of factors relevant to our under
standing of the gap between theory and practice, or perhaps more ac
curately, ideology and practice. In part, he notes, medicine's
professional dominance and social prestige in Western societies has
been secured by cloaking the details of medical skill and knowledge in
*
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a thick fog composed of equal parts mystery and secrecy.3
Esoteric knowledge is critically important if medicine is to retain
its position of dominance both with respect to patients and with re
spect to social institutions that might attempt to regulate or weaken
professional control and discretion. For centuries, medicine has been
able to keep those outside the profession at bay epistemologically by
the use of technical jargon, strange rituals, and through the rigid con
trol of education and licensure regarding health and medical practice. 4
The desire to keep laymen ignorant of medical beliefs and skills
has been exacerbated by a number of social and economic forces in the
post World War II era. The introduction of more technology-thera
peutic, palliative, and diagnostic-has brought with it an increasing
emphasis on specialization within the medical profession. Economic
considerations have encouraged the institutionalization and centraliza
tion of the delivery of medical services. Not only is professional sover
eignty propped up by a cult of mystery within the profession, but
health care is now delivered in settings that are themselves distant,
mysterious, complex, imposing and awe inspiring both in size and in
technological ritual. As medicine becomes, and is encouraged to be
come, increasingly faceless and bureaucratic in the name of cost con
tainment, efficacy, and competition, as fewer and fewer patients know
or have any sort of personal, intimate relationship with a specific phy
sician, the prospects for conversation and open communication be
come increasingly dim.
If nothing more than greed, power, and control were at fault for
the failure of physicians to give greater weight to dialogue and com
munication, it might be difficult as a practical matter to change the
norms of the doctor-patient relationship, but it would not be difficult
to articulate a moral basis for doing so. After all, liberal individualism
is alive and well in Western societies, and few Americans feel tolerant
of those who would rob them of their rights to control their own bod
ies and lives. The prospects for effecting the kind of moral reform
sought by Professor Katz are greatly complicated by the fact that good
as well as evil underlies medicine's long-standing commitment to si
lence rather than conversation in doctor-patient relationships.
Professor Katz suggests it is professional greed mixed with a
healthy dose of professional embarrassment that has hindered the
evolution of conversation as the mainstay of interpersonal relation
ships in therapy and experiment. But this analysis places the burden
3.
4.
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of responsibility for the promulgation of secrecy and silence solely on
the medical profession. If medicine has often reached back to its
quasi-religious roots for its professional authority and autonomy, then
it is equally true that its clientele has felt an equally powerful need to
maintain and support these values as defining the kind of virtues it
wants its healers to exemplify.
Medical professionals are not alone in bearing responsibility for
allowing silence to dominate doctor-patient and researcher-subject in
teractions. Subjects and patients are at fault as well. 5 Patients have
allowed silence to substitute for conversation as a result of a convic
tion, shared and reinforced by their doctors, that healing can be
brought about only when the patient exemplifies the virtues of trust,
obedience, and compliance. Medical uncertainty and ignorance have
long been seen as the primary threats to patient hope, and thus to the
efficacy of medical interventions, not just by physicians but by their
patients as well.
While medicine has eagerly seized the role of priest or even deity
in formulating the values that constitute the boundaries of healer-pa
tient interrelationships, it is equally true that patients also have re
ceived a great deal of satisfaction in having someone occupy this role.
Physicians may have been quick to fill the void left by the decline of
authority accorded organized religion in Western societies, but it must
be recognized, as Professor Katz seems less willing to grant, that it is
their clientele who have been equally eager to have someone occupy
this social niche.
Professor Katz suggests that Upatients rightfully have felt
cheated" (p. 206) by the Uduplicities, evasions, and lies that have infil
trated conversations with patients and made meaningful disclosure
and consent a charade" (p. 206). I would agree that there is far more
empty ritual and half-hearted compliance with the much ballyhooed
norms of disclosure and consent on the part of the medical profession
than the contemporary rhetoric of medical ethics would lead one to
expect. My own observations of patients interacting with their doctors
in a wide spectrum of clinical and experimental settings compel me to
disagree that the failure to behave wholeheartedly and enthusiastically
in accordance with the ethical strictures of disclosure and consent has
been met with protest or resentment on the part of patients or those
5. Siegler, The Doctor-Patient Encounter and Its Relationship to Theories of Health
and Disease, in CONCEPTS OF HEALTH AND DISEASE 627-44 (A. Caplan, H. T. Engel
hardt, Jr., & J. McCartney, eds. 1981).
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who serve as the subjects of biomedical research (chs. one, two, and
seven).
The challenge faced by Professor Katz and others who desire a
more open and honest exchange of information between doctors and
their subjects or patients is that a commitment to the power of magical
thinking is based upon benevolent, not malevolent motives on the part
of health care providers and an equal commitment to the power of
blind faith, miracles, and the healing power of hope on the part of
patients. Obedience, compliance, and trust are, in the appropriate set
tings, virtues not vices. This is what makes it so difficult to inject more
conversation into physician-patient interactions. Both parties under
stand that a commitment to the open and frank exchange of informa
tion about what is and is not known concerning risks, benefits,
prognosis, and efficacy will require the abandonment of other values
believed, rightly or wrongly, to be instrumentally useful in their own
right.
There is little empirical evidence to show that blind faith in medi
cal expertise hastens or aids the power of medical interventions in the
struggle against disease. (I suspect a random clinical trial would show
that those who are atheistic or agnostic about the divine status of their
healers do as well as devoted believers in the powers of the medical
priesthood in confronting serious disease and disability.) Indeed there
is some evidence that demonstrates that compliance and obedience are
facilitated not by blind trust and obedience to authority, but rather by
informed human beings who recognize each other's fallibility and lim
its.6 Nonetheless, the myth of the power of faith to heal when
grounded in benevolent motives on the part of physicians and strongly
felt needs on the part of patients and subjects will not die easily.
There is a bit of a moralizing tone to some of Professor Katz's
analysis which may tum off some of his physician colleagues from the
important message he would like them to hear. Katz suggests that the
burden physicians incur by remaining silent rather than talking openly
with those in their charge is enormous (pp. 171-75, 198-99). It is the
physician who must feel guilt when medical regimens do not produce
the expected and hoped for result. It is the physician who is the object
of disappointment, frustration, and scorn when death, as it always
eventually does, terminates the doctor-patient relationship.
I worry that physicians may not heed the words of support and
sustenance Professor Katz offers if they are blinded by their anger at
6. See generally C. W. LIDZ, A. MEISEL, E. ZERUBAVEL, M. CARTER, L. SESTAK &
L. ROTH, INFORMED CONSENT: A STUDY OF DECISION MAKING IN PSYCHIATRY (1984).
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the suggestion that they have somehow consciously plotted against the
public to maintain the norm of silence in an effort to secure wealth,
prestige, and autonomy for themselves. There is a very real danger
that those who need to attend most closely to the recommendations
Professor Katz offers will not do so since he is not alone in diagnosing
the source of silence in the desire for authority and prestige. A
number of important studies of the history of medicine in the United
States, such as those by Paul Starr, 7 David Rosner, 8 Ruth and Victor
Sidel,9 and others lO have also laid the charge of conspiracy at the door
of the medical profession.
Professor Katz and these other analysts define the cause of the
problem of silence in a way that physicians know is simply not true. It
is not just greed and a lust for power that has led medicine and the law
to tolerate too much silence in physician-patient communication; pa
tients and subjects have desired silence as well.
Can any profession, class, or group, even one as mysterious and
insular as medicine, retain sovereignty over those they serve and, in
deed, over social institutions generally, without some willing compli
ance on the part of those who are the recipients (beneficiaries?
victims?) of their services? After all, physicians have no means of
forcing people into their offices and hospitals. Whatever else may be
wrong in doctor-patient relationships, those who are the victims of
silence are still there voluntarily.
The harsh reality is that it is not only physicians who believe in
the need for secrecy, silence, and mystery where healing is concerned.
Patients believe it, too. It is true that many patients and research sub
jects are attempting to assert themselves, to be heard and to indicate
their willingness to listen closely and carefully to what their physicians
have to say. But the imposition of paternalism and the subjugation of
autonomy are not, as many medical ethicists suggest,II the central sins
of moral life in health care settings. The most common phrase heard
in both experimental and therapeutic encounters is, "I don't know,
doc-you decide. You're the doctor."
Physicians are still as likely if not more likely to be confronted by
patients and subjects who do not want to listen, who do not want to
,

7.
8.
9.

P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE

(1982).

D. ROSNER, A ONCE CHARITABLE ENTERPRISE (1982).
V. SIDEL & R. SIDEL, A HEALTHY STATE (1982).

10. See, e.g., E. R. BROWN, ROCKEFELLER MEDICINE MEN: MEDICINE AND CAPI
TALISM IN AMERICA (1979).
11. S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE
Buchanan, Medical Paternalism, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF., 370-90 (1978).

(1978);

48

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:43

engage in a conversation, but rather who are more than willing to
waive their autonomy in the hope that others who know better, who
are more powerful, or who are more intimately connected with the
mysterious forces of healing will make decisions for them rather than
with them. The real moral challenge facing medicine and those such
as Professor Katz who wish to create an environment in which open
and honest communication can flourish is to decide what behaviors
are legitimate in the face of patient indifference or even hostility to full
participation in the conversations that guide medical encounters.
Paternalism is an easy target for those outside the medical profes
sion to attack. Far more discomfiting, but, I believe far more impor
tant, is the issue of to what extent the medical profession ought to be
held responsible for restoring or enhancing autonomy when it is de
nied, given away, or repressed in the name of healing or out of lazi
ness, fear, or indifference.
Professor Katz suggests that educational reforms are in order
within medicine if secrecy and silence are to give way to communica
tion and open conversation in the doctor-patient relationship (pp. 150
54). In this he is surely correct. Little emphasis is placed upon the
skills of interviewing, listening and communicating in most medical
school curricula. But is a greater emphasis on communication skills
and even, as Professor Katz hints, critical self-examination of one's
character and behavior, enough?
Some medical educators 12 have recognized that a selection pro
cess which rewards expertise in the natural sciences and an aptitude
for performing well on standardized examinations is not necessarily
one which will produce physicians inclined to listen closely, talk
openly and admit their limits and their ignorance when they exist. It
may be necessary to change not only what is taught in medical school,
as Katz suggests, but who is there to learn in order to assure more
conversation on the part of medical professionals.
The economics of medical practice also hinder conversation. Pa
tients often complain that they spend far more time waiting to see
doctors then they actually spend with them. At the same time, most
methods of reimbursement in health care, both retrospective and pro
spective, are much more closely attuned to paying the doctor on the
basis of what is done than to paying the doctor for time spent in con
versation. Conversation, as Professor Katz makes clear, is essential
12. See, e.g., D. CALLAHAN, A. CAPLAN & B. JENNINGS, ApPLYING THE HUMANI
(1985); E. CASSELL, THE PLACE OF THE HUMANITIES IN MEDICINE (1984); Pelle
grino, Educating the Humanistic Physician, 235 J. A.M.A., 1288-94 (1974).
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for both doctor and patient if both are to bear the costs, physical, emo
tional, psychic and financial, imposed by disease and disability. In our
present health care system, however, talk is cheap---too cheap to get
many physicians to attend to it seriously.
Medicine has seen a revolution in the organization of its practice
and settings in recent years, fueled by attempts to control costs. Our
highways are lined with Emergicenters, Surgicenters, MedFirsts, and
any number of other "doc-in-a-box" practices. Health Maintenance
Organizations and Preferred Provider Organizations have grown rap
idly in response to the desire of corporations to lower their health
costs by contracting with plans that will render services under guaran
teed contracts at a discount. Private practice is slowly being replaced
in many medical specialties by group practice.
These changes may bode well for cost containment, but they do
not, unfortunately, bode well for conversation. The ability of large
numbers of patients to seek care from the specific physician of their
choice is eroding. Indeed, it is becoming more and more common for
patients (and even a few research subjects!) to have relationships with
groups, companies or corporate entities rather than individual
physicians.
Groups, companies, and corporate entities have many virtues, but
conversation is not one of them. Anyone who has received a letter
from a group health plan announcing a change or revision in the scope
of the plan would not, I suspect, be overcome with a powerful desire to
engage in a dialogue with the author of such a communication (if such
a term can be applied to these missives) if in fact an author does in
deed exist.
The organization and structure of medicine is moving rapidly
along a path that has characterized much of medical practice in this
century: more centralization, more economies of scale, more institu
tionalization, more teams, more monetarization, and commodification.
Talk of revitalizing the need for conversation will fall on deaf bureau
cratic ears unless care is taken to preserve intimacy, liability, and re
sponsibility in the increasingly impersonal world of medical practice.
I am a bit unfair in arguing that Professor Katz does not give any
recognition to the need to face the reluctance of patients to exhibit
autonomy and participate fully as partners in conversations about
their health and well-being. Professor Katz does argue that patients as
much as physicians must accept an obligation to "participate in the
process of thinking about choices" (p. 122). He enthusiastically en
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dorses Mill's observation 13 that, while we ought not coerce people or
interfere with their liberty, everyone is fair game for criticism, exhorta
tion, education, or, to use Professor Katz's term, conversation.
Nevertheless, there are serious flaws in his solutions to the prob
lem of what to do with those who balk at autonomy and refuse to
deliberate. First, there are many such people. It might be possible to
have physicians act as amplifiers of moral autonomy if the need were
small, but I fear it is not. The amount of exhortation, encouragement,
and entreating required is likely to tax the patience of even the
staunchest proponent of personal freedom.
Second, in Professor Katz's analysis, it is the physician who must
entreat patients to deliberate when they do not wish or are afraid to do
so. But this obligation, of course, puts the mantle of authority
squarely back on the physician's shoulders. It is only the physician in
this view who can see the need for autonomy and entreat the patient to
converse as an alternative to simply dumping autonomy into the
healer's or researcher's lap.
If the only source of autonomy enhancement in health care is the
physician, then has very much progress been made in removing the
stifling veneer of authority that so hinders communication? The
power relationship between physician and patient, particularly when
resources are tight and physicians control access to them, is not con
ducive to assigning the task of exhortation to autonomy solely to those
who are the gatekeepers of the system.
Lastly, patients, like physicians, often have a great deal of vested
interest in avoiding deliberation where w.atters of therapy or research
are concerned. The dying cancer patient, offered the latest immuno
logical wonder potion of genetic engineering, complains "What choice
do I have but to take the damn drug?" Those who wish to keep the
embers of autonomy glowing in such an unfortunate soul can offer
choices about slow and rapid death, painful and less painful death, and
knowledge that mayor may not benefit others, but from the point of
view of the dying patient, this may look like a terrifyingly scant menu
of options. While neither the patient nor the treating physician or re
searcher may believe that deliberation will adversely effect the progno
sis, can we really say that it is morally preferable to face the prospect
of imminent death or severe, disabling disease reflectively rather than
with an attitudinal mixture of denial, repression, and magical
thinking?
I suspect that if patients are going to be encouraged to talk, it will
13.
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21-23 (1947) (\859).
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take more than exhortations from physicians. I think patients will re
quire help from both medical and non-medical sources. Some tradi
tional sources of help in getting people talking about uncomfortable or
disturbing matters, the schools and the churches, seem strangely quiet
about matters pertaining to health care. Abortion aside, our colleges,
secondary schools and elementary schools, and our churches and syn
agogues have little to say about what one ought to know, scientifically
or spiritually, in talking to the doctor.
I would venture to say that the average priest or rabbi is better
prepared to deal with dead bodies than with bodies that are sick, im
paired, or possible candidates for resuscitation or intensive care. Our
high school graduates emerge from school ready to deal with com
puters, but ignorant of the difference between a hospital and a nursing
home, and blissfully unaware of what their rights and obligations
might be when they fall into the maw of medicine. Key social institu
tions must exert greater efforts to educate the public about health care
if the foundation for autonomous behavior is to exist.
Patients and research subjects need help in accepting their auton
omy inside the medical system as well. Research subjects need to have
standard means available for hearing other voices besides the siren-like
call of the researchers who wish to recruit them. IRBs might play this
role, but their willingness to do so seems to be faltering in the face of
institutional and peer pressures to the contrary.14
Those who seek therapy need more than an offer, even if it is a
serious one, of conversation before the CAT scanner hums or the scal
pel is wielded. They need to talk to others with medical knowledge
but whom they are not afraid to offend, repudiate, or embrace. Nurses
and social workers would appear to be likely sources of informed med
ical opinion and even encouragement to autonomy in the face of physi
cian power and authority. Both these groups have acquired a fair
amount of expertise at how best to preserve autonomy in the face of
authority within health care contexts. Neither group is likely to
frighten or intimidate the patient in the way that a physician, whether
willingly or more likely unwillingly, will probably do.
Professor Katz has made a persuasive case for conversation as the
linchpin of doctor-patient relationships. I have tried to suggest that,
while endorsing his argument, there are additional steps that will need
to be taken both within and outside of medicine if the probability of
14. Levine & Caplan, Beyond Localism: A Proposal for A National Research Review
Board, IRB, Apr. 3, 1986, at 7-9; Sheldon, The IRB's Responsibility to Itself, HASTING
CENTER REP., Feb. 1985, at 11-12.
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conversation occurring is to increase. Physicians and patients will
have to be willing to relinquish values and norms that both have found
fulfilling if talk is to replace silence in medical encounters. However,
the rewards of conversation, as Professor Katz's book reveals, are far
greater than continuing to pay the high costs silence imposes on both
physicians and patients.

